An account of the "military revolution" in France ought to command center stage in this effort, for with its victory over the Spanish at Rocroi in 1643, the French army established itself as the premier land force in Europe. In an earlier article I dealt with the growth of the French army and with the soaring budgets and burgeoning administration that came as necessary consequences of that growth.3 There I argued that during the seventeenth century, the army mushroomed from peacetime levels of ten to twenty thousand and wartime strengths of fifty to eighty thousand to reach peacetime figures of one hundred thirty to one hundred fifty thousand with wartime peaks of four hundred thousand. In this article I direct my attention to the more narrowly technical side of the issue-French tactical innovation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Roberts was convinced that the outlines and timetables of changes in tactics and training could not be dismissed as historical marginalia or military buffery. Rather, he saw these changes as causal factors in the formation of standing armies, the reform of military administration, and the consequent growth of armies.
According to Roberts, the "military revolution" transformed infantry tactics by replacing the great Spanish tercios with smaller and more adaptable battalions patterned after Dutch and Swedish practice. He describes the tercio as a clumsy monolithic square containing about three thousand men. It was the first workable mating of pikes and firearms, but like most first attempts it was crude. Putting a premium on solidity, the tactics of the tercio included little if any skilled maneuver. Troops arrayed in such un-wieldy formations required few officers, and the soldiers themselves received only minimal training.
Roberts contrasted the tercio with the battalions pioneered by Maurice of Nassau and further refined by Gustavus Adolphus. Maurice grouped his infantry in battalions of five hundred, which were then strung together along the battle front, creating a thin, or linear, formation. Such a linear order made far better use of the muskets and pikes of the troops, but it demanded that troops master much higher levels of skill in the handling of their weapons and in maneuver. Parker rebutted Roberts by insisting that by the time it battled its seventeenth-century opponents, the tercio itself was no longer the massive, ungainly formation it had been decades earlier; in other words, by incorrectly sketching Spanish tactics, Roberts painted Dutch and Swedish reforms as more innovative than they were.
Three questions need to be asked regarding French infantry organization and tactics during this period. First, where did they fit into the tactical spectrum, that is, how did the wieldy formations required few officers, and the soldiers themselves received only minimal training.
Three questions need to be asked regarding French infantry organization and tactics during this period. First, where did they fit into the tactical spectrum, that is, how did the French fight? Second, does a look at the French example lead us to portray seventeenthcentury tactical change as revolutionary or evolutionary? And third, did military innovation in France flow primarily from native springs, or was it imported from Dutch and Swedish sources?
During the Italian wars (1494-1559), the French relied primarily upon their mercenary Swiss infantry, which fought in massive pike squares, as did the Spanish forces arrayed against them. However, in the Wars of Religion (1562-98), necessity forced commanders to experiment with different tactical combinations.4 Without the resources of royal taxation, and lacking the crown's permanent Swiss and French units, French Protestants faced particularly serious problems in organizing and fighting with their infantry. Partisan warfare, or petite guerre, which called for small units acting independently, familiarized the French foot troops with fighting as companies. Regiments formed for battle as a single line of small company squares in which soldiers stood only ten or twelve ranks deep. These company squares were separated by intervals equal to the front of one square. The intervals could be closed when cavalry threatened.5 Large squares might occasionally be formed in defense against cavalry, with troops marshaled in great masses numbering three to five thousand men; however, French infantry usually stood in regimental formations totaling no more than one thousand men.6
Even as the French adopted small units and abandoned large squares, there were those, Francois de la Noue for example, who still argued in favor of more massive units of two thousand men.7 Thus the debate continued, and military handbooks encouraged this debate. The late sixteenth century witnessed a flood of handbooks which displayed a variety of ornate formations in defiance of simplicity and common sense.8 Arrowheads, windmills, and other fanciful and impractical battle orders were proposed. But this handbook literature should not blind us to the reality.
Under Henri IV (1589-1610), the battalion became the standard combat unit for French infantry. Because French tactical units were already small, the most obvious trait that separated them from later formations was the presence of intervals between the companies. These were now suppressed, and the pikemen massed together in the center of the battalion, flanked on either side by musketeers. On campaign, an average battalion contained about three hundred pikemen and one hundred musketeers. Henri's battalions were also designed to support each other in line or in a checkerboard formation. This alteration of French tactics, which so resembles the work of Prince Maurice, occurred at roughly the same time as, or even predated, the Dutch reforms. After 1600, the French further reduced the ranks of infantry from ten to eight.9 In sum, the French had independently evolved units of similar size, composition, and disposition before they came under the influence of Dutch practices. Consequently, the imitation of Dutch formations could hardly have brought a "military revolution" in Roberts's sense. threatened.5 Large squares might occasionally be formed in defense against cavalry, with troops marshaled in great masses numbering three to five thousand men; however, French infantry usually stood in regimental formations totaling no more than one thousand men.6
Under Henri IV (1589-1610), the battalion became the standard combat unit for French infantry. Because French tactical units were already small, the most obvious trait that separated them from later formations was the presence of intervals between the companies. These were now suppressed, and the pikemen massed together in the center of the battalion, flanked on either side by musketeers. On campaign, an average battalion contained about three hundred pikemen and one hundred musketeers. Henri's battalions were also designed to support each other in line or in a checkerboard formation. This alteration of French tactics, which so resembles the work of Prince Maurice, occurred at roughly the same time as, or even predated, the Dutch reforms. After 1600, the French further reduced the ranks of infantry from ten to eight.9 In sum, the French had independently evolved units of similar size, composition, and disposition before they came under the influence of Dutch practices. Consequently, the imitation of Dutch formations could hardly have brought a "military revolution" in Roberts's sense. cavalry had abandoned the natural advantages that momentum bestowed upon mounted troops. Instead of turning the tide of battle by charging the enemy with sword or lance, horsemen wasted their potential by drawing their pistols to dicker with the enemy in such unfortunate maneuvers as the caracole. To perform the caracole, a body of cavalry several ranks deep approached the enemy. The first rank fired its pistols, wheeled about, and rode to the rear of the formation to reload; the succeeding ranks fired and wheeled in turn. By the time the last rank had fired, the first would be ready to discharge its weapons once again. The intention was to blow a hole in the enemy square, but when used against infantry the caracole almost invariably cost the attacking cavalry more than the defending infantry, because infantry muskets outclassed cavalry pistols in range and power. Roberts awards Gustavus considerable credit for "the emancipation of cavalry from the caracole."19 By restoring cavalry to its traditional role of charging, sword in hand, the great Swede gave his armies a tool for decision on the battlefield that his enemies lacked. Again Roberts's analysis cannot be accepted without challenge. In the case of mounted units, as with infantry, Parker objects that Roberts underestimated the value of Spanish practice. Parker insists that Spanish cavalry, far from being inept, were "as feared and as formidable as the tercios."20 However, it is important to understand that the tactics of the hand gun and the caracole were not seen by contemporaries as Spanish, but rather as German in origin. They were the province of the reiter, the teutonic heavy cavalryman and pistoleer.
When cavalry had abandoned the natural advantages that momentum bestowed upon mounted troops. Instead of turning the tide of battle by charging the enemy with sword or lance, horsemen wasted their potential by drawing their pistols to dicker with the enemy in such unfortunate maneuvers as the caracole. To perform the caracole, a body of cavalry several ranks deep approached the enemy. The first rank fired its pistols, wheeled about, and rode to the rear of the formation to reload; the succeeding ranks fired and wheeled in turn. By the time the last rank had fired, the first would be ready to discharge its weapons once again. The intention was to blow a hole in the enemy square, but when used against infantry the caracole almost invariably cost the attacking cavalry more than the defending infantry, because infantry muskets outclassed cavalry pistols in range and power. Roberts awards Gustavus considerable credit for "the emancipation of cavalry from the caracole."19 By restoring cavalry to its traditional role of charging, sword in hand, the great Swede gave his armies a tool for decision on the battlefield that his enemies lacked. Again Roberts's analysis cannot be accepted without challenge. In the case of mounted units, as with infantry, Parker objects that Roberts underestimated the value of Spanish practice. Parker insists that Spanish cavalry, far from being inept, were "as feared and as formidable as the tercios."20 However, it is important to understand that the tactics of the hand gun and the caracole were not seen by contemporaries as Spanish, but rather as German in origin. They were the province of the reiter, the teutonic heavy cavalryman and pistoleer.
When One is forced to reach the conclusion that Roberts's claim that Gustavus introduced the wide use of light cannon and won Europe over to the use of regimental guns seems at best an overstatement of the case for France. Viewed with the hindsight of military history, there were good reasons why Gustavus's system of light regimental guns would not become a European standard. Two conflicting pressures drove artillery development, presenting seventeenth-century artillerists with a serious dilemma. Battlefield tactics required lighter, more mobile pieces, but the ever greater importance of fortification and siege warfare demanded cannon capable of firing heavy shot great distances. Artillery thus split more and more into two categories, field and siege. As siege warfare came to predominate in the second half of the century, there were real advantages to constructing even field artillery with barrels long enough and chambers thick enough to launch shot effectively against the walls of a fortress. Thus, the extremely light and short-barreled cannon popularized by the Swedes possessed certain inherent limitations, and it is little wonder the French returned to the more substantial pieces advocated by Sully. To this extent, the impact of Swedish practice on seventeenth-century artillery was doomed to be short-lived.
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Before leaving the subject of artillery, it is interesting to note that the "military revolution" did not bring a great increase in the number of cannon that a French army of given size would employ in battle; that is, the ratio of guns per thousand soldiers stayed relatively constant. During the Italian wars, French armies dragged along an impressive number of artillery. At Marignano in 1515 Franqois I is believed to have had seventy-two guns for his army of 30,000, or 2.4 guns for every thousand men. Twenty-eight years later at Ceresole, twenty cannon added firepower to the 13,000 French troops who fought that day, this being about 1.5 guns per thousand. The Wars of Religion witnessed a decline in the heavy use of artillery, probably owing to the limited resources available to all parties. For example, at Dreux, the Protestants had five guns for 11,500 troops, dropping the ratio to . 43 century artillerists with a serious dilemma. Battlefield tactics required lighter, more mobile pieces, but the ever greater importance of fortification and siege warfare demanded cannon capable of firing heavy shot great distances. Artillery thus split more and more into two categories, field and siege. As siege warfare came to predominate in the second half of the century, there were real advantages to constructing even field artillery with barrels long enough and chambers thick enough to launch shot effectively against the walls of a fortress. Thus, the extremely light and short-barreled cannon popularized by the Swedes possessed certain inherent limitations, and it is little wonder the French returned to the more substantial pieces advocated by Sully. To this extent, the impact of Swedish practice on seventeenth-century artillery was doomed to be short-lived.
Before leaving the subject of artillery, it is interesting to note that the "military revolution" did not bring a great increase in the number of cannon that a French army of given size would employ in battle; that is, the ratio of guns per thousand soldiers stayed relatively constant. During the Italian wars, French armies dragged along an impressive number of artillery. At Marignano in 1515 Franqois I is believed to have had seventy-two guns for his army of 30,000, or 2.4 guns for every thousand men. Twenty-eight years later at Ceresole, twenty cannon added firepower to the 13,000 French troops who fought that day, this being about 1.5 guns per thousand. The Wars of Religion witnessed a decline in the heavy use of artillery, probably owing to the limited resources available to all parties. For example, at Dreux, the Protestants had five guns for 11,500 troops, dropping the ratio to . 43 French developments in weaponry, organization, unit size, and the broad outlines of tactics were clearly evolutionary products in which native currents played a preeminent role. Doubtless this evolutionary process was significantly modified by French adoption of Dutch and Swedish styles and refinements; however, as significant as that influence was, it brought adjustments, not fundamental transformation, in the categories discussed above. Yet to deny the radical impact of certain aspects of Dutch and Swedish technical innovation is not to argue that all of it falls short of qualifying as revolutionary. Quite the contrary, viewed from the French perspective, the Dutch creation of drill in particular rates as an absolutely crucial innovation with profound implications both on the battlefield and beyond it.
Drill developed by Maurice and further extended by Gustavus enabled maneuver and a rate of fire unknown before.34 This promise of tactical effectiveness lured French officers to the Netherlands and northern Germany where they might learn the craft of war from the Dutch or the Swedes. In addition, drill had other, less direct consequences, for it uniquely combined training with discipline.
It is fair to say that in a certain sense training and discipline were not integrally linked to each other until the seventeenth century. Certainly, monarchs and commanders of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had viewed training as important, and when the need arose, great effort might be expended to train troops in a new system of warfare. A good example is the training camp established by Louis XI (1461-83) at Pont-de-l'Arche, where French infantry bandes received instruction from Swiss mercenaries.35 Yet training was regarded as a one-shot affair. It went no further than teaching weapons-handling and combat technique, and once troops had mastered their weapons and learned how to stand for battle, their training was considered to be complete.36 Few argued that there was any need for constant practice. At the same time, discipline was seen as a question of control and restraint. Most contemporary references to discipline, or the lack of it, stressed the need to limit pillage and to ensure the good conduct of troops quartered on the civilian population.37 Surprisingly little was said concerning the need for obedience in battle; it seems that discipline was not a combat issue of the first order.
Dutch drill united training with discipline in the name of maximizing the battlefield assets of maneuver and firepower by minutely regulating the action of the troops. To achieve this end, troops required constant practice responding to commands under the watchful supervision of their sergeants and officers. It is not stretching a point to say that in the name of tactical necessity, drill ingrained habits of obedience which affected the soldier's conduct and heightened the officers' control on and off the battlefield.
Under the direction of Maurice of Nassau, Dutch infantry learned to maneuver in cadence and in step as the ancient Romans had.38 Though the square formations of the sixteenth century could present a strong face to all four directions, they had done so at the cost of wasting manpower, for relatively few weapons could be brought to bear to the front. Formations were thus solid but inefficient. Linear tactics, such as those employed by the Dutch, made the most of manpower by facing all weapons to the front in relatively thin formations. However, a threat to the flank or rear posed a serious problem. Linear formations claimed greater efficiency then, but they were more vulnerable if taken off guard. The best way to overcome this intrinsic disadvantage was to train troops to maneuver under fire, so that they could face front to flank or rear, whenever they were threatened, without losing their cohesion. Dutch drill rendered such maneuvers reliable and rapid.
Under At the same time, discipline was seen as a question of control and restraint. Most contemporary references to discipline, or the lack of it, stressed the need to limit pillage and to ensure the good conduct of troops quartered on the civilian population.37 Surprisingly little was said concerning the need for obedience in battle; it seems that discipline was not a combat issue of the first order.
Under the leadership of Maurice and Louis of Naussau, the Dutch regulated and improved the use of the pike and the loading and firing of the arquebus and the musket. Maurice broke down the handling of weapons into a series of steps and trained troops to perform these in strict sequence. (There were thirty-two steps for TACTICAL   EVOLUTION  IN THE FRENCH ARMY  TACTICAL  EVOLUTION  IN THE FRENCH ARMY  TACTICAL  EVOLUTION  IN THE FRENCH 
